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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CATHLEEN L. RACKLEY ] 
Petitioner and Appellee, ] 
V . j 
FAIR VIEW CARE CENTERS INC., ) 
A Utah Corporation, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
> Case # 970213-CA 
i Priority 15 
ARGUMENT 
L FAIRVIEW APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS, NOT FACTUAL FINDINGS MARSHALING OF THE 
EVIDENCE WAS NOT REQUIRED OR APPROPRIATE. 
Appellee's brief complains that Fairview neglected to marshal the evidence. This claim is 
erroneous. When an appellant, such as Fairview, challenges a trial court's Finding of Fact and 
wishes the Appellate Court to reverse those findings, marshaling of the evidence is required and 
deemed appropriate. To successfully challenge a trial court's "Findings of Fact," on appeal, an 
Appellant has the obligation of marshaling the evidence in support of those findings and, 
considering that evidence in a light most favorable to the jury, still demonstrating that the 
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. In Re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989). To undertake such a task as marshaling all of the evidence in a case is "rigorous." 
Oneida/SLIC v Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 
1994). Appellant (hereinafter "Fairview") noted the difficulty of such a task when formulating 
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the decision not to attack the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff (herein after "Appellee") had 
been fired Although Fairview disputed this at trial and continues to maintain the belief that 
Appellee quit, Fairview refrained from raising this issue on appeal in accordance with the 
realization that appealing such a factual finding would probably be a fruitless endeavor Here, 
Fairview chose only to appeal the trial court's "Conclusions of Law," asking the appellate court to 
answer the questions, what is "clear and substantial public policy," and what is "conduct 
furthering such a public policy Ml Both of these inquiries involve questions of law and require 
that the Appellate Court make a determination as to whether the trial court correctly applied its 
"Findings of Facts" to the legal standards involved State v Pena. 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 
appellant's brief plainly states that these are the only issues appealed from At pp 10 of 
Appellant's brief it states the following 
Issue 1. Did the trial court error in finding that Ms Rackley's termination 
implicated a clear and substantial public policy? 
Standard of Review. This issue involves two separate inquiries The first 
a question of law Does a clear and substantial public policy exist which requires 
that a nursing home notify a resident when funds come in addressed to them when 
the resident has previously signed a release indicating that a relative will be 
handling their monies9 The second is a question of fact If a public policy does 
exist which would require such action, did the termination of Ms Rackley 
implicate this public policy Thus, this issue involves a mixed question of fact 
and law which is reviewed with a varying degree of scrutiny depending on the 
particular circumstance State v Pena. 869 P 2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
Appellant's brief at pp 10, 11 
Issue 2. Did the Trial Court error in determining that Fairview terminated 
Ms Rackley as "punishment" for conduct furthering a clear and substantial public 
policy9 
Standard of Review. This issue involves three separate inquiries First, a 
question of law Does a clear and substantial public policy exist9 Second, a 
question of law, Would Ms Rackley's actions tend to further this public policy 
Third, a question of fact Was Ms Rackley fired for this conduct9 Thus, this 
issue involves a mixed question of fact and law which is reviewed with a varying 
degree of scrutiny depending on the particular circumstances State v Pena. 869 
P 2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
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1994) In such a case, marshaling the evidence is neither required or appropriate As noted in 
Taylor v Department of Commerce. 1998 WL 54628, *5 (Utah App ), 952 P 2d 1090 (Utah App 
1998), 336 Ut Adv Rpts 16 (1998), where the court dismissed the Appellee's claim that 
Appellant had failed to marshal the evidence, stating," we think the issue is more accurately 
characterized as whether the Division correctly applied the facts it found to the legal standards of 
gross negligence and gross incompetence We thus do not reach the Department's claim that 
Taylor failed to marshal the evidence " 
Although Appellee complains that Fairview failed to marshal the evidence, Appellee's 
statement of issues appears to acknowledge that Fairview is in fact appealing from the trial 
Court's legal conclusions rather than its findings of fact—to wit, in Appellee's "Statement of 
Issues Presented for Review. " at page 2, issue number 3, Appellee sets forth the following 
issue 
3_ Whether the District Court correctly ruled that Fairview's termination of Ms 
Rackley's employment implicated a clear and substantial public policy 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be de novo (as purely a question of law) "[AJppellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness '" State v Pena. 
869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), "correctness" means "the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the 
law " Id., State v Deli. 861 P 2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) 
At page 3, issue number 4, Appellee also sets forth the following issue 
4_ Whether the District Court correctly ruled that Ms Rackley's conduct in 
advancing Muriel Mellen's rights constituted conduct furthering clear and substantial 
public policy 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be de novo (as purely a question of law) "[AJppellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness '" State v Pena. 
869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
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Accordingly, Appellee appears to concede the point that the questions and determinations that 
Appellant appeals from are a legal conclusion In such a case there is no need for Fairview to 
marshal and, accordingly, Fairview properly refrained from doing so 
II. ALL OF THE ISSUES APPEALED FROM WERE PRESERVED BY 
APPELLANT IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellee's brief suggests that the issues appealed from were not preserved in the trial 
Court This suggestion is incorrect Fairview appeals from two determinations made by the trial 
court Appellant's brief at pp 10, states those issues as "Issue 1. Did the trial court error in 
finding that Ms Rackley's termination implicated a clear and substantial public policy," and, 
"Issue 2. Did the Trial Court error in determining that Fairview terminated Ms Rackley as 
'punishment' for conduct furthering a clear and substantial public policy?" These two legal 
questions, which Fairview appeals from, are the very same legal issue briefed prior to trial and 
argued throughout the district court action (Defendant and Plaintiffs trial briefs at R000195-
000232 and R000241-000286) Hence, no single place in the record exists where these appellate 
issues were specifically preserved because these issues, listed above, constituted the entire 
dispute, which was presented and argued at trial This is not a case where, for example, the 
appellant is appealing from an improper ruling on the admissibility of evidence and must show to 
the appellate court that an objection to this error was made while the case was before the trial 
court Rather, in this case, the appellant is asking the appellate court to correctly rule on the 
same legal issues that formulated the entire basis for the trial court action 
The issues of whether a "clear and substantial public policy" existed and whether 
Appellee was fired for "conduct furthering" said public policy, were briefed prior to the trial, 
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were argued in opening (Tr Vol 1 at pp 13-25) and in closing (Tr Vol 5 at pp 1163-1231), and 
were the basis for most—if not all—of the testimony given throughout this lengthy and exhaustive 
proceeding (See Tr Vol 1-5) As such the entire record evidences a continuing preservation of 
the issue as to whether or not a "clear and substantial public policy" existed that was the basis for 
Appellee's termination from Fairview Care Centers and whether her phone call to Sharon Mellen 
was "conduct furthering" any public policy 
III. APPELLEE'S BRIEF IS DEFICIENT. 
Rule 24 (a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a brief shall 
contain, "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority " Appellee failed to follow this rule for her fifth issue, 
which asks this court" 5_ Whether Fairview is judicially estopped from taking positions on 
appeal that are directly contrary to those taken during the District Court proceedings," (Appellee 
brief at p 3) by failing to set forth the standard of review or supporting authority for this issue 
stating only that "Since the District Court was not presented with this issue, this court should 
simply review Fairview's positions taken during the trial proceedings and the positions taken on 
appeal and determine, as a matter of law, whether Fairview is estopped from taking a contrary 
position on appeal" Appellee should be barred from making this estoppel argument because 
Appellee improperly presented it in briefing by leaving out both the proper standard of review or 
any supporting authority for this proposition As such, this issue should not be considered by the 
Court 
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IV. APPELLEE'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
Appellee raises the technical argument that Appellant's brief does not comply with Rule 
24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which addresses what should be included in 
an addendum It is true that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadvertently not 
included in Appellant's addendum However, before burdening the Court with such a highly 
technical and immaterial argument, perhaps Appellee should correct the errors in her own brief, 
which completely failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
According to Rule 24(a)(2), a brief—including a reply brief— shall contain,"[a] table of contents, 
including the contents of the addendum, with pages referenced " A quick look at Appellee's Brief 
indicates Appellee's complete failure to comply with this requirement Appellee's technical 
argument regarding addendums does not go to the merits of this case and should not be considered 
by this court 
V. NO CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY WAS IMPLICATED IN 
APPELLEE'S TERMINATION 
Funds were delivered to Fairview Care Center for Muriel Mellen (Tr Vol 1 at pp 140, 
Tr Vol 3 at pp 570-571) Certain Fairview employees decided to let Sharon Mellen, Muriel 
Mellen's daughter-in-law, tell Muriel Mellen that her money had arrived (Tr Vol 1 at 140-141) 
Sharon Mellen wanted to explain to Muriel Mellen that some important purchases should be made 
with this large sum of money Id_ Sharon Mellen hoped to convince Muriel Mellen that the money 
be spent wisely and in Muriel Mellen's best interest (Tr Vol 3 at pp 777, 876, and 879) 
Appellee became aware of this situation and called Sharon Mellen to complain of this occurrence 
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(Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 580-868) Fairview's general manager, Mr. Peterson, became aware of this 
situation after he received an angry phone call from Sharon Mellen (Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 576-578, 
580, and 868). Appellee was terminated as a result of her actions and the employees who 
temporarily withheld information from Muriel Mellen about her check were both given a verbal 
warning and written reprimands for their conduct (Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 585, 589 and Tr. Vol. 1 at 140-
141, 114-115)2 In response to this situation, Mr. Peterson instituted an official written company 
policy that requires that staff immediately inform residents of all incoming funds. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 
pp. 114-115) He did so with the intention that such a situation would not repeat itself Nothing in 
Mr. Peterson's actions violated any "clear or substantial" public policy. Fairview did not violate 
any laws by their handling of Muriel Mellen's funds. (Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 1075) 
In handling this situation as he did, Mr. Peterson acted as a reasonable and prudent 
businessperson would. He had the right to protect the integrity and the reputation of his facility 
and he did so in a way he believed was appropriate. Nothing was done to prevent residents in the 
future from knowing about their funds; in fact, his actions made certain that all future residents 
would know about their funds. To punish this general manager and his facility for his actions 
would be to put honest business persons on notice that they must second guess their every move 
when disciplining employees for fear of expensive litigation. This would not be proper and would 
not advance the purpose of the "public policy" exception as articulated in our growing body of 
2
 Mr. Peterson, Fairview's general manager, continues to maintain that he did not fire 
Appellee that day. While he admits that he intended to do so prior to meeting with her, he 
maintains that he did not fire her during their meeting. Instead, Mr. Peterson maintains that he 
gave Appellee a thorough scolding for her careless acts in upsetting Sharon Mellen, and for her 
failure in not approaching either him or another high-positioned administrator with her concern. 
Fairview did not appeal from the Court's Factual Findings regarding this point and simply 
mentions this here so that the record is clear. 
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case law in this area Fox v MCI Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997), Heslop v 
Bank of Utah. 839 P 2d 828 (Utah 1992), Peterson v Browning. 832 P 2d 1280 (Utah 1992), 
Hodges v Gibson Prods Co. 811 P 2d 151 (Utah 1991). Berube v Fashion Center. Ltd . 771 
P2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 
Since the inception of the "public policy" exception, the Utah Supreme Court has been 
abundantly clear in its rulings that this exception should be narrowly construed and should not act 
to punish the honest businessperson ld_ Adherence to Appellee's position would require this court 
to apply this exception liberally and to punish an honest businessman This would be improper 
Nothing in the current law suggests that this is a direction the Utah Supreme Court is interested in 
heading within this area of the law Id. 
In order for a tort action to lie here, the "public policy" claimed must be so "clear and 
substantial" with no "ambiguity on" either "point" that the employer clearly has notice of what 
type of conduct would be prohibited Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States. 
Inc. 844 P 2d 949, 966 n 9 (Utah 1992)3 Retherford tells us that in order to prove this tort, the 
3
 Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States. Inc . 844 P 2d 949, 966 n 9 
(Utah 1992), states as follows 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" to 
support a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine 
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it affects the public as a whole 
The very words "clear and substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points As 
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a statute are not 
expressions of public policy Many statutes merely regulate conduct between private 
individuals or " 'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental 
public policy concerns '" Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal 3d 
654, 254 Cal Rptr 211, 217, 765 P 2d 373, 379 (1988)) [emphasis added] 
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute embodies a 
clear and substantial public policy First, one must ask whether the policy in question is 
one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only Second, one 
must inquire whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty 
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complainant must show that she was discharged "in a manner or for a reason that contravened a 
'clear and substantial public policy' of the State of Utah—a public policy rooted in Utah's 
Constitution or statutes " Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States. Inc . 844 
P 2d 949, 966 n 9 (Utah 1992) Appellee's brief fails to explain how the "public policy" claimed 
is either clear or substantial The seven constitutional and statutory requirements listed by the 
District court in it's "Findings and Conclusions" evidence no such "clear" public policy as the one 
that Appellee claims Fairview violated 4 Nothing in these legal precepts put Fairview on notice 
that "public policy" requires that all residents, regardless of the circumstances of the individual 
resident and the releases located in the file, must be immediately informed of incoming funds 
Further, nothing in these statutes even suggests that a nursing home employee such as Appellee 
has a duty to call and confront family members when concerns about patient's funds arise As 
stated in Appellant's brief, a Health Program Manager from the Utah Department of Health 
Bureau of Medicare-Medicaid, Program Certification and Resident Assessment, was questioned 
that we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to 
discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining 
power Since these are the consequences of qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort 
action, these considerations should inform the evaluation of the policy itself See id. at 
1288 (Zimmerman, J , concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, C J ), see also Foley, 
765 P 2d at 379-80 & n 12 " (emphasis added) 
4
 The seven provisions which the District Court found to be the basis for a "clear and 
substantial" public policy are 
Article I, Section I of the Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution 
42 U S C §§3058g(a)(3) and (5) 
Utah Code Ann §§ 62A-3-201, et seq. 
4 2 U S C § 1396 (i) (6) 
Utah Admin Code § R432-150-4 
4 2 C F R §483 10 
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specifically about Fairview's handling of Muriel Mellen's funds and this witness indicated that 
Fairview had not acted improperly in handling Muriel Mellen's funds (Tr Vol 4 at pp 1075, 
Appellant Brief at pp 30-31) If this witness, a Utah State health program manager in the area of 
nursing home resident's funds does not believe Fairview acted improperly, then certainly, 
regardless of whether or not Fairview erred in some way, their error was not a violation of any 
"clear and substantial public policy" mandate Appellee's brief asks this Court to disregard this 
witness's statements because this witness, "is not the judge and cannot make legal conclusions " 
Fairview concedes that this witness is not the judge, but instead is a state employee in a 
management position who's job specifically requires her to understand the proper procedure for 
the handling of a patient's funds Who better than this witness to enlighten the Court as to what 
policies exist in the area of patient's funds in nursing homes It was this witness's position that 
Fairview did not act contrary to any policy At a minimum, this testimony indicates there is no 
"clear or substantial public policy" requirement that Fairview act differently than it did, and no 
tort action lies here 
Appellee's brief acknowledges that nothing in the above- mentioned constitutional 
provisions and statutes specifically contemplates or prohibits the actions taken by Fairview in this 
case (Appellee's brief at pp 22) As such, it is not "clear" how funds should be handled under 
circumstances such as the case of Muriel Mellen Nonetheless, Appellee asks this court to punish 
Fairview for their actions, as though they had notice that they were prohibited from acting as they 
did in this matter Such a suggestion offends basic notions of due process and is contrary to the 
case law on point which specifically mandates that the "public policy" exception will not be 
allowed absent a showing that the policy involved was both "clear and substantial " Appellee's 
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position, to the contrary, is inconsistent with the case law addressing this issue, Foxv MCI 
Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997), Heslop v Bank of Utah. 839 P 2d 828 (Utah 
1992), Peterson v Browning. 832 P 2d 1280 (Utah 1992), Hodges v Gibson Prods Co . 811 P 2d 
151 (Utah 1991), Berube v Fashion Center. Ltd . 771 P 2d 1033 (Utah 1989), accordingly, 
Appellee's position is erroneous and should be disregarded 
Appellee's brief suggests thatthe public policy concerns that are "implicated in this case 
are clearly evidenced by the testimony of many of the witnesses in this case," (Appellee's Brief at 
pp 30-31) suggesting that because two Fairview employees testified that Muriel Mellen had a 
right to know of incoming money, that a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule is 
then created This reasoning is strained and erroneous First, these witnesses cannot make legal 
conclusions They are not the judge and do not create the laws in the State of Utah with regards to 
when the public policy exception will be allowed This is a legal determination left first to the trial 
court judge and now to this Court 
Second, one of the two employees who testified that Muriel Mellen "had a right to know" 
was the same person who briefly withheld from Muriel Mellen the fact that the money had come 
in-evidencing her obvious belief that it was appropriate to allow Ms Sharon Mellen an 
opportunity to personally inform Muriel Mellen that the check had arrived Appellee 
misrepresents her testimony to suggest that this witness believed that she was violating public 
policy at the time that she agreed to allow Sharon Mellen to personally inform Muriel Mellen of 
the funds The other employee who made this statement was Mr Peterson, who is the same 
person responsible for Appellee's termination, and for instituting an official policy at Fairview 
that would, in all future cases, require immediate notification to resident's when funds arrived 
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(Tr Vol 1 at pp 114-115) Mr Peterson's decision to institute this internal policy at Fairview, 
although commendable, certainly does not create a "public policy" exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine of the State of Utah 
Mr Peterson, the general manager of Fairview acted as a reasonable, prudent, and honest 
businessman would He did not, either as an individual or on behalf of Fairview, violate any 
"clear or substantial" public policy of the State of Utah and he should not be punished as if he had 
The trial court erred in finding to the contrary and that determination should be put aside 
VI. APPELLEE'S CONDUCT WAS NOT "IN FURTHERANCE OF" PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
Appellee's brief refers to Muriel Mellen as a "victim" and suggests that Appellee was fired 
for informing the "victim" that her check had come in Appellee's claim is completely erroneous 
First, Appellee's suggestion improperly characterizes Muriel Mellen's position in life Muriel 
Mellen is not a victim, her family and the Fairview facility where she resides have looked out for 
her and have cared for her In his oral decision, the trial court judge notes the same 
I don't criticize Sharon Mellen Sharon Mellen is not a thief Sharon Mellen did 
not steal this money from Muriel Mellen I don't criticize the facility for working with 
Sharon Mellen to, I guess, protect Muriel Mellen from her own best desires and interest of 
having the money because of all of the other problems that were attendant with Muriel 
Mellen 
Sharon Mellen is a wonderful daughter-in-law, as far as I'm concerned, if she's 
going to support this woman during the time that she didn't get her checks Once again, 
12 
I'm not critical of Sharon Mellen at all (Trial Court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1237) 
Additionally, while making the suggestion that Muriel Mellen has been victimized, 
Appellee's brief conveniently fails to note that at the time Appellee was telling Muriel Mellen, 
"the victim," of the arrival of her check, that the check had already been deposited to Muriel 
Mellen's own personal account (Tr Vol 3 at 576-577, 695, 867) 
Second, Appellee's brief suggest that Appellee's conduct was in furtherance of public 
policy because she, Appellee, was fired for telling Muriel Mellen about the money (See 
Appellee's brief at pp 33) Nothing in the trial testimony, or the court's oral decision supports this 
statement The testimony at trial clearly indicated that Appellee's phone call to Sharon Mellen 
was the impetus that led to Fairview's general manager, calling Appellee in for a meeting where 
he told her that her employment at Fairview could not continue (Tr Vol 3 at 580-581, 586, 589, 
776) 
The trial testimony also indicated that although Appellee told Muriel Mellen of the arrival 
of her check, Appellee was not the first person to do so, (Tr Vol 3 at p 692) in fact, another 
Fairview employee told Muriel Mellen about the check before Appellee did Id_ The trial court's 
Oral Decision in this matter clearly expresses the trial court's understanding that Appellee's firing 
was caused by her phone call to Sharon Mellen (Trial court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 
1236-1239) The trial court articulates this while discussing the possible reasons why Appellee 
was fired, by stating the following 
the ostensible reasons for firing, all of which were not presented by Mr 
Peterson, but were mentioned in the January meeting, had all been taken care of [meaning 
that all the issues presented in the January meeting were resolved at the time of 
13 
termination] in Mr Peterson's own testimony and handwriting 
He [referring to Mr Peterson] had indicated on that exhibit, [referring to Mr 
Peterson's list of reasons why Appellee's employment should be terminated, which Mr 
Peterson presented Appellee at their last meeting] and I don't know which one specifically, 
taken care of, not an issue, so what does that leave? It leaves then, 
ostensibily, the telephone call to Sharon Mellen at work. 
Well, what is that related to? The reason for the telephone call to Sharon Mellen at 
work was the concern the Plaintiff [Appellee] had for the possible violation of Muriel 
Mellen's right to know that she had that money, that she had the $720 00 " (Trial court oral 
decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1236, emphasis added) 
A few lines later in it's oral decision, the trial court again refers to the phone call stating, 
" the Plaintiff [Appellee] may have very well jumped the gun, maybe should have talked to 
other people who were more conversant with the Mellen file, maybe should not have even called 
Ms Mellen at work " (Trial court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1237) 
Finally, the trial court indicates it's understanding that the phone call was the cause of the 
termination stating that, "if in fact, she was fired for the phone call, if, in fact, she was fired for 
the looking out for resident's rights, I agree with Mr Peterson, that shouldn't be done here That's 
exactly what happened here " (Trial court's Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1239) 
In the instant case, the trial court found that Fairview terminated Appellee as punishment 
for making a call to Sharon Mellen, which the trial court erroneously believed was conduct 
furthering a public policy (R 00001236, R 0001239) Even if a "clear and substantial" public 
policy did exist that would require immediate notification to a resident of funds received, 
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Appellee's conduct in calling Sharon Mellen, at her place of work, is not the type of conduct that 
our Supreme Court has been willing to recognize as furthering such a policy Fox v MCI 
Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997) While public policy may require nursing 
home employees to report suspected exploitation of residents to the proper authorities, that is not 
what Appellee did in this case, and this was not the cause of her termination She was fired for 
the irresponsible and unprofessional act of confronting a resident's family member at their place of 
work about suspected misconduct by that person 
Appellee has not shown the court that any specific duty existed in law which would 
require a nursing home employee to confront resident's family members whenever that employee 
suspects wrongdoing Fairview has made an exhaustive search and has found that no statute or 
constitutional provision places such a duty or public obligation upon nursing home employees 
Appellee's actions in this matter were therefore not "conduct furthering" a public policy of the 
State of Utah and her termination is not actionable 
While Appellee may have been treated punitively by Fairview, her punishment was not for 
conduct furthering a "clear and substantial public policy" but instead for inappropriate and 
unprofessional conduct, which needlessly caused upset to a family member of a resident The trial 
court's determination to the contrary was incorrect and should be reversed 
VII. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS NO BAR TO FAIRVIEW'S CLAIM. 
Appellee argues that Fairview is judicially estopped from arguing on appeal that Fairview's 
termination of Appellee is completely unrelated to any public policy concerns because Fairview 
did not violate any laws in their handling of Muriel Mellen's money (Appellee's brief at pp 36 
and 37) In support of this argument, Appellee cites to Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank 
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v Mehr. 791 P 2d 217, 22 (Utah App 1990) which states the following 
Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge of all the facts will not be 
allowed to take a position to fruition, and later, with no substantial change in 
circumstances, return to attack the validity of the prior position or the outcome 
flowing from it see, 28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel & Waiver §§68-70 (1966) 
Appellee also cites to Hill v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co . 829 p 2d 142, 148, n 4 
(Utah App 1992) which states the following 
A doctrine which seeks to prevent a party in legal proceedings from taking a 
position, pursuing that position to fruition, and later returning to attack the validity 
of the prior position or the outcome flowing from it Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d 
491, 496 *Utah 1980), Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v Mehr. 791 
P 2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct App 1990) The purposes underlying the doctrine include 
avoiding inconsistency, duplicity and waste of time Seattle First Natl Bank v 
Marshall, 31 Wash App 339, 641 P 2d 1194, 1197 (1982) 
Appellee's argument, however, overlooks a few crucial points in making this assertion First, 
Fairview neither at the trial court nor in Appellant's brief has taken the position that a violation of 
law is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of a public policy violation (Appellant's brief at pp 
13) Although Appellant believes that such a determination by this Court would be appropriate, 
Appellant acknowledges that the law in this area is not completely developed and it is as yet 
uncertain whether the courts will require a violation of law before finding that a "clear and 
substantial public policy" exists Fairview mentions the fact that they did not violate any laws as 
additional support and credence to their main position that there was no clear and substantial 
policy that required them to treat Muriel Mellen's check any differently than they had Fairview's 
position is that one obviously recognizable way that the State's legislature may create the public 
awareness of a clear and substantial policy is by creating laws which regulate the specific action 
and set forth clear and recognizable punishment for violation of that law That puts the public as a 
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whole on notice that they should not violate that law or take action in a contradictory stance to it 
The elected officials are given the ability to create restrictions on behavior which are recognizably 
clear to the citizens Having no current legislation in this area as testified to by the State's 
Manager of the Health Program from the Department of Health Bureau of Medicare-Medicaid, 
Program Certification and Resident Assessment, and mentioned earlier in this brief, Fairview 
simply attempts to show the court that this is a clear sign that Appellee's termination was not 
improper or otherwise a violation of any public policy 
Second, the precedent cited regarding judicial estoppel does not support Appellee's 
position, and, therefore, is fatally flawed Appellee's own case law, as quoted in Appellee's brief 
and copied above, indicates that judicial estoppel prohibits a party from pursuing a "position to 
fruition, and later with no substantial change in circumstances, returning] to attack the validity of 
the prior position " (Appellee's brief at pp 36 and 37) Hill v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Co. 829 P 2d 142, 148, n 4 (Utah App 1992) Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d 491, 496 (Utah 
1980) Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v Mehr. 791 P 2d 217, 220 (Utah App 1990) 
Appellant, by definition, did not take any position to "fruition" as Appellee alleges RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 537 (1995), defines the term "fruition" as "1. attainment 
of anything desired, realization, accomplishment to bring an idea to fruition 2. enjoyment, as of 
something attained or realized 3. the state of bearing fruit" Here, Appellant has not been 
attained, realized, or otherwise enjoyed any relief in regards to the outcome of this action in the 
trial Court Appellee argues that Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980), should apply 
to the instant case Condas does apply and Condas illustrates that judicial estoppel is no bar to 
Fairview's argument on appeal Condas states that "a party who has taken a position in prior 
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litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position in 
another action." (Emphasis added) Id First, the litigation which Appellee alludes to as being 
"prior litigation" is the same case which is currently up on appeal. Appellee inappropriately 
attempts to make this case seem as though it were two separate and individual cases, when it is 
simply and obviously the same case. Second, Appellant has never obtained relief from a prior 
litigation—even in this same case, as Appellee tries to aruge—which would estop them from taking 
an opposing position in a new litigation as Condas v. Condas regulates. There was no "fruition" 
for the Appellant. No relief was obtained. Accordingly, the law of judicial estoppel does not 
apply to the current case in regards to what Appellant has argued on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Fairview is respectfully requesting that this Court reverse the 
decision of the trial Court. 
DATED THIS ^ H f a y of ~ 1 ^ * , 1998. 
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